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Abstract: 
This article reviews recent developments in the assessment of creativity using self-report scales. 
We focus on four new and promising scales: the Creative Achievement Questionnaire, the 
Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviors, the revised Creative Behavior Inventory, and the 
Creative Domain Questionnaire. For each scale, we review evidence for reliability, validity, and 
structure, and we discuss important methodological features for users to consider. We then 
present new analyses of each scale based on a large, diverse sample. We evaluate each scale's 
item-level and scale-level psychometric features, using both classical test theory and item 
response theory, and we examine how the scales converge. All four scales performed well and 
covaried highly with each other. Based on the latest generation of tools, self-report creativity 
assessment is probably much better than creativity researchers think it is.  
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Article: 
The psychology of creativity, like many scientific fields, is split over some hard problems. Is 
creativity associated with mental illness? Is there a domain-general creative trait or ability? Is 
creativity primarily individual or sociocultural? But creativity researchers do agree on some 
things, and one of those things is that measuring creativity is hard. Assessment has been a vexing 
problem for creativity researchers over the decades, in part because creativity research aspires to 
observe and measure things that are atypical, novel, innovative, and unusual, be they products, 
ideas, or people. 
Creativity assessment broadly sorts into a few categories of measurements: creative products, 
creative cognition, creative traits, and creative behavior and accomplishments ( Kaufman, 
Plucker, & Baer, 2008). In this article, we describe and evaluate several recent self-report 
methods for assessing creativity, particularly everyday creativity, creative achievements, and 
creative self-concepts. We intend this article to serve as a primer for researchers interested in 
measuring creativity with self-report scales. We describe each scale in detail (e.g., what it 
measures, whether it covers different creative domains), review any statistical quirks or issues 
(e.g., skewed scores, low base rates, ordinal scales), discuss past work that provides evidence for 
reliability and validity, and present new data on item-level and scale-level psychometric 
properties based on a large, diverse sample. At the end, we evaluate the relationships between the 
different self-report scales, thus illuminating how they converge and diverge. 
Because of our emphasis on self-reported creativity, we won't cover several popular kinds of 
creativity assessment. For example, assessing creative products, such as with the consensual 
assessment technique (CAT; Amabile, 1982), is outside of the scope of this article. Several 
recent books and articles review how to assess creative products generally and the CAT 
specifically ( Baer, Kaufman, & Gentile, 2004; Hennessey, Kim, Guomin, & Weiwei, 2008; 
Kaufman & Baer, in press; Kaufman, Plucker, & Baer, 2008). Likewise, we don't review the 
assessment of creative abilities using performance tasks; divergent thinking is the best known 
example of such assessment. Many recent articles and several handbook chapters review this 
controversial assessment domain ( Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011; Plucker & Makel, 2010; Plucker & 
Renzulli, 1999; Silvia et al., 2008). 
About the Sample  
To evaluate the self-report measures of creativity, we collected data from a sample of 1304 
people. The participants were enrolled at the University of Nebraska at Omaha (48%) or 
California State University, San Bernardino (52%). People completed the questionnaire online 
and received credit toward a research participation option in a psychology course. The final 
sample was diverse. The sample consisted primarily of young adults: the average age was 22.9 
years old ( SD = 6.63, Mdn = 21), and age ranged from 17 to 66. Approximately 76% of the 
sample was female. Based on self-reported race and ethnicity, approximately 55% of the sample 
was European American, 26% was Hispanic/Latino, 7% was African American, and 6% was 
Asian American. Consistent with the high proportion of Hispanic and Latino participants, 17% 
of the sample said that Spanish was the primary language spoken at home. The median past-year 
family income was $50,000 to $59,999, and the median past-year personal income was less than 
$15,999. 
We excluded respondents with extensive missing data and respondents who indicated at the end 
of the questionnaire that they didn't pay much attention while filling it out, both perils of web-
based data collection. Because of different patterns of missingness, the sample size varies from 
scale to scale. 
Creative Achievement Questionnaire  
The Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ; Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005) measures 
creative accomplishments in 10 domains: Visual Arts, Music, Dance, Architectural Design, 
Creative Writing, Humor, Inventions, Scientific Discovery, Theater and Film, and Culinary Arts. 
Unlike most self-report scales, the CAQ aims to capture Pro-c or Big-C creativity ( Beghetto & 
Kaufman, 2007; Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009), so it focuses on significant, observable 
accomplishments. Only people with significant achievements in at least one domain receive high 
scores on the CAQ. By design, then, the CAQ yields highly skewed scores that pile up near the 
floor of the scale. Such scores are awkward to analyze, as we'll see later, but they reflect the true 
distribution of Big-C accomplishments. 
The CAQ uses an innovative and complex scoring approach. The items and scoring instructions 
are in an appendix to Carson et al. (2005) article. Each domain has eight items, numbered 0 
through 7, that represent increasing levels of creative achievement. For all domains, the first item 
indicates no training, experience, or accomplishment. For the Creative Writing domain, for 
example, the first item is “I do not have training or recognized talent in this area.” If people 
endorse the first item, they receive zero points for the domain and skip to the next one. The 
remaining items ask about increasingly rare levels of accomplishment that are logically 
connected, so endorsing a high item implies endorsing prior items. People receive more points 
for the items involving higher accomplishment. Most of the items are binary—people check 
whether an item applies to them—but some items involve writing a number, such as the number 
of patents awarded to their work and the number of awards received. For the Creative Writing 
domain, for example, item 7 asks people to provide a number in response to “My work has been 
reviewed in national publications.” For the free-response items, the participant's response is 
multiplied by the item number. Someone with three reviews in national publications, for 
example, would receive a score of 21 (3 reviews × 7, the item number) for the item. To get a 
domain score, researchers simply sum the domain's items. Scores range from zero (someone 
endorsed only the “no training or talent” item) to unrestricted high values. 
Evidence for Reliability, Validity, and Structure 
Regarding internal consistency, the CAQ does not lend itself to traditional analyses of internal 
consistency. Each domain includes eight items, but the items are not like Likert items, which are 
presumably tau-equivalent (i.e., each item has equal weight). For the CAQ, different items 
deliberately have different weights, and the items would not be viewed as interchangeable 
elements of a broader item pool. Likewise, the eight items aren't independent: if someone 
endorses the first item (indicating no accomplishments), then the other items receive zeros; 
similarly, if someone endorses a high-achievement item, then the prior items ought to have been 
endorsed. Within a domain, then, estimating Cronbach's alpha is not necessary. Researchers have 
done so— Carson et al. (2005), for example, report alpha values ranging from .70 to .87—but the 
CAQ domain scores don't meet the assumptions of a classical reliability analysis. It is best to 
think of each CAQ domain scale as a means for generating a single score, not as a conventional 
Likert scale. 
At the scale level, estimating the internal consistency of the 10 domain scores is more 
informative. Such an analysis presumes that the 10 domains are markers of the same underlying 
factor. The 10 domains don't seem to form one factor ( Carson et al. 2005; Silvia, Kaufman, & 
Pretz, 2009), but researchers commonly compute an overall score, which implies a single 
underlying factor. 
Regarding evidence for validity, the CAQ has been extensively used. Research to date suggests 
that the scale effectively captures differences in creative achievements. In the original article, 
Carson et al. (2005) report that people with higher overall CAQ scores created better products in 
a collage-making task ( r = .59), had higher divergent thinking scores ( r = .47), and were higher 
in openness to experience ( r = .33). Openness to experience has been a robust predictor of CAQ 
scores in several later studies ( Hirsh & Peterson, 2008; Silvia, Nusbaum, Berg, Martin, & 
O'Connor, 2009). CAQ overall scores didn't appreciably correlate with measures of anxiety, 
depression, or social anxiety symptoms, but they did correlate with the Creative Behavior 
Inventory ( r = .59), a measure of everyday creativity ( Dollinger, 2003), and divergent thinking ( 
r = .21; Silvia & Kimbrel, 2010). People with higher CAQ scores displayed more flexible 
cognitive control in a Stroop paradigm ( Zabelina & Robinson, 2010) and had higher IQ scores ( 
r = .34) and cumulative grade point averages ( r = .18; Mar, DeYoung, Higgins, & Peterson, 
2006). In samples with high education and intelligence, higher CAQ scores were associated with 
a genetic marker of psychosis risk ( Kéri, 2009) and with decreased latent inhibition ( Carson, 
Peterson, & Higgins, 2003). 
Regarding factor structure, Carson et al. (2005) reported a series of exploratory factor analyses 
that suggested that the 10 domains sorted into two or three factors. In the two-factor model, they 
suggested an Arts factor (composed of drama, writing, humor, music, visual arts, and dance) and 
a Science factor (composed of invention, science, and culinary arts); the architecture domain was 
excluded. In the three-factor model, they suggested an Expressive (composed of visual arts, 
writing, and humor), Performance (composed of dance, drama, and music), and Scientific 
(composed of invention, science, and culinary arts) structure; the architecture domain was 
excluded. The inconsistent evidence regarding the factor structure probably stems from a few 
things, such as the huge differences in variances between the 10 domain scores and the extreme 
skew in each score. Both solutions are unsatisfying: each excludes the architecture domain, and it 
is odd to see the culinary arts domain lumped in with the science and invention domains. 
Subsequent research has generally collapsed across the 10 domains to get an overall score, a 
decision that presupposes a single factor. 
Notable Issues 
Data screening 
One reasonable concern with self-report measures of creativity is whether people will honestly 
report low scores. This concern is overstated, we think. Most of the self-report scales reported in 
this paper have scores that pile up at the low end, and most people receive zeros on most 
domains of the CAQ. It thus seems like people are perfectly comfortable reporting a lack of 
accomplishments. Creativity researchers probably overestimate how much the public at large 
values creativity. 
The CAQ should be particularly robust against score inflation because it asks about concrete 
activities, not general self-perceptions of creative tendencies. It is also possible, however, that its 
scores underestimate creative accomplishments that are typical of college students. For example, 
maximal points are given for publications and recognition from critics (i.e., accomplishments 
more likely for graduate students and professionals), but some scales don't account for gradations 
of awards (e.g., local, regional, national, international)—a more common reflection of creative 
activities encountered by younger students and those performing on a team (e.g., dance team, 
musical group, forensics team). 
A more realistic problem, however, concerns implausible values. In theory, the CAQ's items 
function as stair steps: people shouldn't endorse the high-achievement items without also 
endorsing the preceding items. For example, no one should endorse “I have been paid to act in 
theater or film” without having endorsed the earlier item “I have performed in theater or film.” 
But some participants have aberrant response patterns, such as endorsement of only a single high 
value or endorsement of illogical patterns of accomplishments. It isn't clear what to do with such 
response patterns, and the literature on the CAQ to date has not discussed it. (Only a small 
percentage of a sample will have unusual patterns, but this subgroup can have a large influence 
simply because they are part of the minority that didn't get a score of 0 or 1.) 
As with many problems, prevention is probably the best solution. For computer-based 
administration of the CAQ, the items can be presented conditionally: if people endorse the “no 
achievement” item, the program can move to the next domain, thus preventing certain illogical 
patterns. Another option is to include a scale that screens for random or inattentive responding. 
One example is the infrequency scale ( Chapman & Chapman, 1983), which asks items that 
nearly everyone endorses or rejects (e.g., “There have been a number of occasions when people I 
know have said hello to me”). People who endorse more than a few items in the aberrant 
direction are probably responding randomly, not paying attention, or trying to fake an aberrant 
response profile. 
Another realistic problem concerns the response criterion people use when judging each item, 
particularly the open-ended quantity items. Participants can interpret these items loosely, and one 
sometimes wonders whether participants are giving themselves too much credit. This is true of 
all self-report items—people can interpret the items in different ways and subjectively define the 
scale anchors ( Biernat, 2003). For the CAQ, the problem is pressing because of the scale's 
extreme skew. If people interpret the multiplier items loosely, they will end up with huge, 
outlying scores. For example, one multiplier for the Scientific Discovery item asks how many 
research grants people have been awarded. Scientists can view this loosely (e.g., small internal 
seed grants or travel grants) or stringently (e.g., grants from major federal funding agencies). 
Novices and experts may view the item differently. A novice might consider a small internal 
grant as being worthy, whereas an expert might list only major awards, resulting in the novice 
and the expert receiving the same score. 
Score skew and overdispersion 
By design, the CAQ yields highly skewed scores: most scores pile up at the scale's floor, and a 
few people have extreme scores. Because of the multiplier items, the range of possible scores is 
vast. Such skew was intended because the true population distribution of creative achievements 
must be skewed: by definition, Big-C creativity is uncommon. 
Psychology has traditionally used two methods for dealing with highly skewed data. The first, 
denial, involves ignoring the skew and just running the analyses anyway; the second, faith, 
involves recognizing the skew but asserting that the general linear model is “robust” to violations 
of normality. We discourage researchers from these venerable methods. The degree of skew in 
the CAQ shouldn't be ignored, and conventional regression models aren't robust to such severe 
violations of their assumptions. 
Instead, researchers should consider models designed for what Long (1997) calls “limited 
outcomes,” such as ordinal, nominal, truncated, censored, and count data. Count models are 
especially valuable for studying creative achievements. Count outcomes follow a Poisson 
distribution, and one curious property of Poisson distributions is that the mean equals the 
variance. As a result, count data are inherently heteroskedastic. In psychological data, however, 
the variance is often larger than the mean, a condition known as overdispersion. The CAQ 
domains are overdispersed because of excessive zeros. Researchers can handle such distributions 
with a family of extended Poisson models, such as negative binomial models ( Hilbe, 2007) and 
zero-inflated Poisson models ( Long, 1997). Some work with the CAQ has used such models. 
Silvia and Kimbrel (2010) used negative binomial models to predict CAQ domain scores, and 
Silvia et al. (2009) treated the domains as count variables in their latent class analysis of the 
CAQ. Popular statistics software has good options for count models, and there are many good 
sources for interested researchers ( Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Long, 1997). 
Another way to handle the severe skew in the CAQ is to condense the scores into ordinal 
categories, such as low, medium, and high. For example, people with zero for a domain would be 
scored as 0, people with scores between 1 and 10 would be scored 1, and people with scores of 
10 or greater would be scored 2. These are off-the-cuff suggestions—researchers would need to 
empirically evaluate such a scoring scheme—but we offer them as food for thought for future 
research. Ordinal data are much easier to work with than the CAQ's awkward raw scores. 
Although it might sound like much information is being lost, an ordinal scoring system probably 
captures most of what researchers want to know about the respondents, particularly for samples 
of young adults who are early in their creative development. 
Summary scores for factors and classes. 
The CAQ provides 10 scores, one for each domain. Research to date has not settled on ways to 
reduce the 10 domains into a smaller number of scores, or even whether collapsing across 
domains is a good idea. In the factor analysis approach, the domains would be assigned to 
factors, such as the two-factor and three-factor models suggested by Carson et al. (2005). Our 
sense is that the factor analytic evidence for the CAQ is still preliminary. Neither of Carson et 
al.'s factor solutions included all 10 domains, and the analyses did not seem to take steps to 
accommodate the serious skew in the scores. Additional research (particularly work involving 
confirmatory models) is needed. 
An alternative approach to factor analysis, suggested by Silvia et al. (2009), is to explore whether 
the participants form discrete groups defined by patterns of creative accomplishments. This 
approach uses latent class analysis to look for nominal clusters of creative accomplishments. 
Unlike factor analysis, which looks for groupings of domains, latent class analysis looks for 
groupings of participants that have similar patterns of domain scores. In their analysis of the 
CAQ, Silvia et al. found evidence for three kinds of classes. The first class (around 66% of the 
sample) was a no creativity class: people in this group had low scores on all 10 CAQ domains. A 
second class (around 17% of the sample) was a visual arts class: people had elevated scores on 
the visual arts domain but not on any other domain. The third class (around 17% of the sample) 
was a performing arts class: people had elevated scores on the theater and film, music, dance, 
and creative writing domains. The latent class approach thus suggests that the creative 
achievements measured by the CAQ are domain-specific rather than domain-general: the 
undergraduate students in that sample had no accomplishments, accomplishments in the 
performing arts and writing, or accomplishments in the visuals arts. 
Factor analysis and latent class analysis aren't exclusive approaches to the structure of the CAQ 
domains. For most research purposes, factors are more practical than latent classes. For studies 
of whether creativity is domain-general or domain-specific, Silvia et al. (2009) argued that latent 
class analysis can provide better evidence for domain-specificity than factor analysis can. Either 
way, examining the structure of the CAQ domains deserve more attention in future work. 
The Present Data 
Table 1 depicts the descriptive statistics for the 10 CAQ domains. In addition to the usual 
suspects, Table 1 displays the percentage of the sample that endorsed a 0 or a 1 for the domain. 
The severe skew is obvious: for each domain, at least half the sample has only a 0 or 1. 
Cronbach's alpha for the 10 domains was .60, which is consistent with presumed domain 
differences. 
Table 1 is omitted from this formatted document. 
To evaluate the CAQ's structure, we started with confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) of the 
factor structures suggested by Carson et al. (2005): a two-factor model (Arts and Sciences) and a 
three-factor model (Expressive, Performance, and Scientific). For illustration purposes, we 
treated the CAQ domains as continuous scores, as in most past work. Both the two-factor model 
(CFI = .763, RMSEA = .101, SRMR = .058) and the three-factor model (CFI = .764, RMSEA = 
.105, SRMR = .058) fit quite poorly on most of the indices, according to conventional cut-offs ( 
Kline, 2010). It is difficult to know whether the poor fit is attributable to poor model 
specification, to the non-normal indicators, or to both. 
As an alternative, we specified the indicators as count variables. These models were estimated in 
Mplus 6.1, using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors and Monte Carlo 
integration. We estimated CFA models with one, two, and three factors and compared them 
using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Both 
the AIC and BIC favored the three-factor model over the other two; it is important to note, 
however, that this does not “confirm” the three-factor model per se, but it does indicate that it is 
relatively better than the other two. 
We also examined the latent class structure of the CAQ. Silvia et al. (2009) found distinct classes 
of creative achievement in their analysis of the CAQ, and we were curious to know whether 
latent classes would replicate in a new sample. 1 We settled on a five-class solution, which is 
depicted in Figure 1. The classes were defined by different domain-specific patterns of creative 
achievement. The largest class (61.2% of the sample) was a no creativity class: people in this 
group had low scores on all 10 domains. Three of the classes reflected domain-specific 
achievement, such as a visual arts class (11.9%), a dance class (13.9%), and a music class 
(9.3%). Finally, a small polymath class appeared. People in this group—only 3.7% of the 
sample—had high scores in the visual art, dance, and creative writing domains. Like our past 
study, then, we found that scores on the CAQ define latent nominal groups with distinct patterns 
of achievement. In particular, most people have low scores on all the domains, and people with 
high scores tend to have them in only one domain. 
 
Figure 1. Latent classes of creative achievement in the CAQ. 
Overall Evaluation 
The CAQ is a clever scale. The innovative scoring approach accomplishes the developers' goal 
of creating a scale that yields highly skewed scores. The rarity of high scores is consistent with 
the notion that Big-C creativity is uncommon, and it reassures researchers who fear that most 
participants will claim accomplishments that they don't really have. The wide use of the scale 
shows that it works in the feral world of research with real participants. It's a good choice for 
creativity researchers who want to measure variation in Big-C creative achievements. 
Analyzing the CAQ requires more thought than the usual self-report scale. First, conventional 
regression will nearly always be inappropriate for analyzing the domain scores. Models for 
overdispersed count data, such as negative binomial models and zero-inflated models, will work 
well for the count structure of the CAQ domain scores. Researchers should also explore the value 
of simplified ordinal scoring systems based on cut points. Second, research has not yet settled on 
methods for distilling the 10 domains into summary scores. The most common approach—
summing or averaging across the 10 domains—is convenient, but it ignores the heterogeneity 
within the domains. Factor analyses find that the 10 domains don't seem to load on a single 
factor, and latent class analyses find clusters of people with high scores in different domains, not 
a group that is high on everything. 
Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviors  
The Biographical Inventory of Creative Behaviors (BICB), developed by Batey (2007), is a 34-
item scale that assesses everyday creativity across a broad range of domains. The BICB presents 
people with a range of behaviors and asks whether people have done them. It thus broadly 
resembles the CAQ in its behavior-anchored approach, but it has some interesting and useful 
differences. First, the domain coverage of the BICB is quite broad. The items cover the common 
domains of everyday creativity, such as arts, crafts, and creative writing, but they also cover 
social creativity, such as leadership, coaching, and mentorship. As a group, the items represent 
the most common kinds of everyday creative actions. 
Second, the BICB uses a forced-choice yes/no response format. The scale's instructions ask 
people to indicate which activities they have been actively involved in during the past 12 months. 
The 34 activities are listed, and people simply check the ones that they have been actively 
involved in. The items are thus categorical—the forced-choice format yields binary 0/1 scores 
for each item. To obtain an overall scale score, researchers simply sum across the items, which 
yields a possible range of 0–34. The BICB does not have subscales. 
Evidence for Reliability, Validity, and Structure 
As a newcomer to the creativity assessment scene, the BICB is just starting to gain attention 
from researchers. Thus far, the scale has performed well in several studies of creativity. 
Regarding evidence for reliability, past work has reported Cronbach's alphas of .74 ( Furnham, 
Batey, Anand, & Manfield, 2008), .78 ( Batey & Furnham, 2008; Batey, Furnham, & Safiullina, 
2010), and .76 ( Silvia & Nusbaum, 2010). Regarding evidence for validity, research has found 
correlations that one would expect. For example, the BICB correlates positively with divergent 
thinking fluency ( r = .22, Furnham et al., 2008; r = .21, Batey, Furnham, & Safiullina, 2010) and 
with openness to experience ( r = .38, Furnham et al., 2008; r = .33, Batey, Furnham, & 
Safiullina, 2010), two common markers of creativity. 
Regarding the scale's factor structure, it appears that published research has not yet examined 
whether the BICB's items yield a single “creative behavior” factor. Given the diverse item 
content and the tendency for measures of creative behavior to yield domain-specific factors, it's 
important to examine the scale's factor structure. 
Notable Issues 
The BICB has several issues that researchers using the scale should take into account. First, 
categorical data pose analytic problems for general linear models. Just as binary outcomes in a 
regression model require generalized linear models (e.g., logistic or probit regression; Long, 
1997), binary outcomes in an exploratory or confirmatory factor analysis require generalized 
models. Latent variable models for diverse kinds of outcomes are well-developed in the statistics 
literature ( Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004), but they have been slow to catch on in the world of 
applied research. Treating binary data as continuous violates several assumptions of conventional 
linear models: the residuals won't be normally distributed or homoskedastic, and the model can 
predict severely out-of-range values. 
Second, the BICB has significant skew in its overall score. This was a deliberate feature of the 
scale, given its roots in Eysenck's (1993) notion that traits follow a normal distribution but 
creative achievement follows a Poisson distribution. We can illustrate the skew using our dataset; 
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of BICB scores in our sample. The skew in the BICB is not 
nearly as severe as the skew in the CAQ domains. Researchers with small sample sizes can apply 
transformations to the raw scores, such as a log transformation, that will make the distribution 
more normal. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of BICB scores. 
Researchers with larger sample sizes have more options for handling the skewed scores. The 
binary items can be specified as binary indicators of a latent BICB variable in a confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA). A CFA with binary data is simply an item response theory (IRT) model, 
and IRT models estimate normally distributed latent trait scores based on the binary responses. 
Researchers in the Bayesian tradition can use Bayesian Marcov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
methods ( Lynch, 2007), which don't make the distributional assumptions made by traditional 
frequentist statistics, although we suspect that it will be a while before Bayesian MCMC models 
catch on in creativity research. 
The Present Data 
In our data, the BICB had good internal consistency. Cronbach's alpha was .89 when computed 
traditionally. An alternate way of estimating alpha that recognizes the binary quality of the data 
is to compute alpha from CFA loadings (for examples and details, see Hancock & Mueller, 2001; 
Silvia, 2011). We conducted a CFA that specified the items as tau-equivalent binary indicators 
and estimated Cronbach's alpha from the standardized loadings. Alpha for this model was .95. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the items. The “% Yes” column lists the percent of the 
sample that responded with a yes, meaning that they did the creative action within the last year. 
The BICB items clearly capture a wide range of difficulty: some actions are common (e.g., items 
6 and 31, which refer to decorating a personal space and to coming up with jokes) and others are 
quite rare (e.g., items 2 and 23, which refer to writing novels and publishing research). 
Table 2 is omitted from this formatted document. 
To explore the scale's structure, we first conducted exploratory factor analyses using Mplus 6.1. 
We considered models with up to three factors with an oblique geomin rotation ( Browne, 2001). 
The items were modeled as categorical (i.e., as binary outcomes). We used maximum likelihood 
with robust standard errors and Monte Carlo integration. A single factor model was the best 
representation of the data. Statistically, models with several factors generally had poor structure, 
and the secondary factors lacked clear interpretations. Practically, the 34-item BICB covers a lot 
of ground, and it doesn't have enough items for any particular domain to yield reliable domain-
specific factors. 
To gain insight into the BICB's item-level features, we examined the items using item response 
theory (IRT). We estimated a two parameter logistic (2PL) model using Mplus 6.1. Such a model 
estimates each item's discrimination and difficulty values. In IRT, an item's difficulty is 
expressed on the same scale as the underlying latent trait, which is in the standard normal z 
metric. Difficulty values thus have an intuitive interpretation: they are the trait level at which 
someone has a 50% chance of saying yes to the item. For example, item 20 (“made someone a 
present”), an easy item, had a difficulty value of −.694. This means that someone with a below-
average level of everyday creativity (around −.69 SDs below the average) has a 50% chance of 
saying yes to the item. In contrast, item 2 (“wrote a novel”), a hard item, had a difficulty value of 
2.121. This means that only people who are more than 2.121 standard deviations above the mean 
in everyday creativity have more than a 50% chance of endorsing this item—it takes a lot of 
creativity to have written a novel. 
The IRT discrimination values refer to how quickly item responses change as the underlying 
latent trait changes. They are conceptually (and statistically) related to factor loadings in a CFA: 
items with high loadings change more quickly as the latent trait changes, whereas items with low 
loadings change more slowly as the latent trait changes. Discrimination values range from 0 to 
around 3. All the discrimination values for the BICB were good, and many were quite high. It's 
worth noting that it isn't necessarily desirable for all the items to have very high discrimination 
values. Such items provide a lot of information but only for a narrow range of the trait ( 
Embretson & Reise, 2000). 
One way to summarize the items as a whole is to estimate the scale's total information function, 
which depicts the amount of information the BICB provides at different levels of the trait. Unlike 
classical test theory, which assumes that measurement error is constant across the trait, IRT 
allows researchers to estimate which range of the trait is estimated most precisely. For the BICB, 
the information function peaked at a trait level of around 1.50, which is fairly high (see Figure 
3). One way to interpret this finding is that the BICB produces more reliable scores for people 
with high scores than for people with low scores. Stated differently, the BICB is good at 
discriminating the very high from the high from the somewhat high, but it is less good at 
discriminating the low from the very low. 
 
Figure 3. Test information function for the BICB based on a 2PL IRT model. 
The IRT analyses allow us to revisit the issue of the BICB's significant skew. An IRT model is a 
kind of generalized latent variable model ( Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004), in which a 
continuous, normally distributed latent trait is presumed to cause scores for indicators that aren't 
continuous (e.g., indicators that are ordinal, censored, truncated, or counts). Figure 4 shows the 
relation between a simple BICB sum score and the IRT-based trait score. As expected, they're 
related nonlinearly, and the IRT-based scores are less skewed. 
 
Figure 4. Relationship between simple sum scores and IRT-based trait scores for the BICB. 
Overall Evaluation 
The BICB has not yet been widely used, but our analyses suggest that it deserves more attention 
from creativity researchers. The scale had a solid factor structure and internal consistency, and 
the IRT analyses indicated that the scale has good item-level properties (difficulty and 
discrimination values) and good scale-level properties (test information). The primary practical 
issue for researchers stems from the binary response format. Researchers with smaller samples 
should consider transformations of the overall score; researchers with larger samples should 
consider CFA models with binary indicators or IRT-derived trait scores. The scale is brief and 
easy to use, so we imagine that it will be a popular choice in future work. 
Creative Behavior Inventory  
The Creative Behavior Inventory (CBI), initially developed by Hocevar (1979), was one of the 
first self-report measures of creative behavior and accomplishment to be widely used in research. 
Hocevar generated an item pool by asking college students to list their most creative 
achievements and behaviors in several domains. Experts then rated each item in the pool for 
creativity. Items receiving low expert ratings of creativity (i.e., items the experts felt didn't reflect 
creativity) were discarded, and applications of classical test methods eventually yielded a 90-
item scale that measured creative behavior in several domains: fine arts, crafts, literature, math-
science, performing arts, and music. 
The original CBI has been used in several past studies. Hocevar (1980), for example, explored 
how divergent thinking, intelligence, and creative behavior covaried. He found that ideational 
fluency scores correlated with total CBI scores as well as several CBI subscales (crafts, 
performing arts, and math-science), and that crystallized intelligence (measured with synonym-
antonym and analogies tasks) correlated with the total CBI score. 
Recent research, however, has preferred a shortened form of Hocevar's scale developed by 
Dollinger (2003). Dollinger's short form didn't simply abbreviate the original inventory: the new 
scale shifted the underlying construct. Hocevar's scale includes many items that refer to 
infrequent, high-level accomplishments of the sort that appear on the CAQ, such as founding 
literary magazines and publishing literary and scientific work. Dollinger's short form weeded out 
the high-level items and retained items referring to common creative behaviors, such as making a 
costume, writing poems and song lyrics, and sketching. As a result, the short form should be 
considered a measure of everyday creativity, whereas the long form covers both everyday 
creativity and eminent creative achievement. 
In addition to shifting the inventory toward common creative behaviors, Dollinger eliminated 
many of the domains in favor of a single factor consisting of common behaviors, most of which 
come from the art, crafts, and writing subscales of the original inventory. The revised scale thus 
lacks domain subscores. Researchers interested in domain differences may lament the collapsing 
across domains, but Hocevar's (1979) full scale doesn't seem to capture domain differences as 
well as the CAQ does. In his reanalysis of Hocevar's data, for example, Plucker (1999) found 
that the full CBI yielded only a single factor. 
Evidence for Reliability, Validity, and Structure 
Regarding reliability, past work with the revised CBI has reported Cronbach's alphas of .88 ( 
Dollinger, Burke, & Gump, 2007) and .89 ( Dollinger, 2003; Dollinger, Clancy Dollinger, & 
Centeno, 2005). Regarding evidence for validity, research has shown that the CBI correlates with 
many other markers of creativity, such as a creative drawing task ( r = .31; Dollinger et al., 
2005), an overall score from the CAQ ( r = .59), self-rated creativity ( r = .52), and divergent 
thinking ( r = .19; Silvia & Kimbrel, 2010). Moving beyond measures of creativity, the CBI 
correlates with several aspects of personality, such as openness to experience— r = .37 in a 
correlation analysis ( Dollinger, 2007) and β = .62 in a structural equation model ( Silvia et al., 
2009)—political conservatism ( r = −.27; Dollinger, 2007), Gough's (1979) creative personality 
scale ( r = .43; Dollinger et al., 2005), need for cognition ( r = .35; Dollinger, 2003), and need for 
uniqueness ( r = .33; Dollinger, 2003). Regarding evidence for factor structure, it doesn't seem 
that the factor structure of the CBI has received much attention. 
Notable Issues 
Researchers should note that the CBI uses a four-point ordinal response scale. People are asked 
to complete each item using the following scale: A = Never did this, B = Did this once or twice, 
C = 3–5 times, and D = More than 5 times. Most studies using the scale have treated the items as 
continuous rather than ordinal, but the overall scale score is sufficiently skewed for researchers 
to be concerned. Figure 5 shows the overall scores from our dataset. The practical options are the 
same as for the BICB. Researchers who are using the observed overall score could simply 
transform it; a log transformation, for example, would make the overall distribution more 
normal. Researchers using latent variable methods with large samples, in contrast, could specify 
the items as ordinal indicators for a latent CBI variable, which would yield a polytomous IRT 
model ( Embretson & Reise, 2000). The IRT option is impractical without a substantial sample 
size, given that the CBI has 28 items. 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of CBI scores. 
The Present Data 
In our dataset, internal consistency was high: Cronbach's alpha was .92. Table 3 presents item-
level descriptive statistics. The four response options (A, B, C, and D) were scored as 1, 2, 3, and 
4. The lowest response option (A = Never did this) was the most frequent response for 26 of the 
28 items, and 1 was the median for most of the items, indicating significant skew. Not 
surprisingly, then, the overall average of the 28 items was skewed as well, as shown in Figure 5. 
Table 3 is omitted from this formatted document. 
To explore the CBI's factor structure, we conducted an exploratory factor analysis in Mplus 6.1 
using maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors and an oblique geomin 
rotation. The results suggested that a one-factor model reasonably described the data. Scree plots 
strongly suggested only one factor. Furthermore, the factors after the first correlated highly with 
the first factor, were defined by few items, and lacked an obvious meaning. Overall, then, the 
single-factor model implied by past work seems suitable. 
So far, we've presented analyses that treated the CBI items as continuous, but they're clearly 
ordinal. The response options should yield ordinal scores, and the pile-up of scores at the floor 
further indicates that the items are categorical instead of continuous. We don't want to condone 
pretending that categorical data are continuous, but we recognize that few researchers will have 
the sample size needed to model the items appropriately. A good option is to model the items as 
categorical (ordinal indicators with four levels) in a CFA, which yields a polytomous IRT model. 
Such a model requires a large sample because many parameters are estimated. Each item, for 
example, has a discrimination value and three difficulty values (the trait levels at which people 
cross a threshold from one scale value to the next), and the CBI has 28 items. Table 3 displays 
the factor loadings for the CBI based on a CFA with ordinal indicators. Overall, the items had 
good loadings. 
To demonstrate the value of an IRT approach, Figure 6 depicts the relationship between IRT-
based trait scores and the simple average of the CBI items. The relation between the two 
variables is nonlinear, which reflects that the two scoring methods diverge the most at the low 
and high ends of the trait. The distribution of IRT-based trait scores was substantially more 
normal, as would be expected. 
 
Figure 6. Relationship between simple item averages and IRT-based trait scores for the CBI. 
Overall Evaluation 
The 28-item CBI is a good choice for research. It captures a range of creativity, with an emphasis 
on everyday creative actions, and it has performed well in past work and in our own data. Both 
the item-level and scale-level properties were good, and past research has found expected 
relationships with many other measures of creativity and several dimensions of personality. The 
main issue concerns the significant skew in the overall scores. Researchers with large samples 
should consider IRT-based trait scores; researchers with smaller samples should consider 
transformations of the overall score. 
Creativity Domain Questionnaire  
The Creativity Domain Questionnaire (CDQ) measures people's beliefs about their level of 
creativity in different domains. Whereas the prior scales focus on observable behaviors and 
accomplishments, the CDQ focuses on people's self-concepts. People are asked “How creative 
would you rate yourself in…” and then given items from different domains, such as acting, 
computers, dancing, leadership, and writing. People's self-concepts are interesting in their own 
right, and they have been extensively studied in social psychology ( Epstein, 1973; McConnell & 
Strain, 2007). Self-beliefs about creativity are also interesting for practical reasons. People use 
their beliefs about their traits, preferences, and abilities when choosing hobbies, careers, friends, 
and relationship partners, so self-beliefs play a role in many high-stakes decisions. 
The CDQ has its roots in early work by Kaufman and Baer (2004), which explored the structure 
and correlates of self-rated creativity. They developed a brief 11-item scale, known as the 
Creativity Scale for Different Domains (CSDD). Respondents were asked to rate their creativity 
in different areas—for example, “How creative are you in bodily/physical movement (for 
example, dance, sports, etc.)?”—using a five-point scale (1 = Not at all, 5 = Extremely). Ten 
items referred to different domains of creativity; the final item asked people to give a global 
rating of their creativity. Kaufman and Baer found evidence for an empathy/communication 
factor (composed of communication, interpersonal relationships, solving personal problems, and 
writing), a hands-on creativity factor (composed of crafts, art, and bodily/physical), and a 
math/science factor (composed of math and science). The CSDD has been used in several studies 
of creativity as a complement to measures of creative abilities and achievements (e.g., Rawlings 
& Locarnini, 2007; Silvia & Kimbrel, 2010; Silvia et al., 2009). 
For studying creative self-perceptions across domains, however, the CSDD was too short. The 
item coverage was too sparse to capture the many domains of human creativity, so a longer 
version was developed. The first CDQ ( Kaufman, 2006) contained 56 items, each answered on a 
six-point scale. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses ( Kaufman, Cole, & Baer, 2009) 
suggested seven domains: performance, math/science, problem solving, artistic-visual, artistic-
verbal, entrepreneurial, and interpersonal. Except for the math/science domain, all the domains 
loaded strongly on a higher-order creativity factor. Kaufman (2006) used the long CDQ to 
appraise ethnic and gender differences in self-reported creativity, and Silvia et al. (2009, Study 
2) found that the CDQ domains were better represented as continuous factors than as nominal 
latent classes. 
The most recent incarnation of the CDQ, the Revised Creativity Domain Questionnaire (CDQ-
R), balances the breadth of the long CDQ with the brevity of the original scale ( Kaufman et al., 
2009). The CDQ-R has 21 items that form four factors: drama (e.g., acting, singing, writing), 
math/science (e.g., chemistry, logic, computers), arts (e.g., crafts, painting, design), and 
interaction (e.g., teaching, leadership, selling). Each item is completed on a six-point scale 
ranging from Not at all creative to Extremely creative. The four domain scores can be averaged 
to obtain a global creativity score. The items and instructions are published in Kaufman et al. 
(2009). 
Evidence for Reliability, Validity, and Structure 
Regarding evidence for reliability, Kaufman et al. (2009) reported Cronbach's alphas of .71 for 
the math/science, arts, and interaction subscales and .76 for the drama subscale. Alpha was .82 
for the full 21-item scale. Regarding evidence for validity, Kaufman et al. (2009) found that 
creativity ratings across the domains correlated with personality in coherent ways. Openness to 
experience strongly predicted all four domains and the global score; the remaining factors of the 
Big Five had domain-specific patterns (e.g., extraversion predicted higher drama ratings but not 
higher math/science ratings), consistent with past work that has found both domain-general and 
domain-specific aspects of personality and creativity (e.g., Feist, 1998; Silvia et al., 2009). 
 
Regarding the structure of the CDQ-R, Kaufman et al. (2009) settled on the four factor structure 
based on both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. Exploratory analyses suggested a 
good solution for the preferred four-factor model, but they also found a good three-factor 
solution that mapped onto the artistic, intellectual, and everyday creativity factors proposed by 
Ivcevic and Mayer (2009). A confirmatory model found that the four-factor solution showed 
acceptable fit (CFI = .92, RMSEA = .05) after several items' residuals were allowed to covary. 
This suggests that the evidence to date for the four factor solution is somewhat preliminary. 
Notable Issues 
After grappling with the awkward distributions and response scales of the prior scales, the 
ordinariness of the CDQ-R is refreshing. People complete each item using a six-point scale—
there's no midpoint—and the item-level distributions usually aren't horribly skewed. The four 
subscales and the global creativity index have essentially normal distributions. The distributional 
differences reflect a difference between measures of creative achievements (which are always 
skewed) and creative aspects of personality (which are normally distributed). 
The Present Data 
The CDQ-R's internal consistency was higher in the present data than in Kaufman et al.'s (2009) 
sample. Cronbach's alpha was .78 for the drama subscale, .84 for the math/science subscale, .78 
for the arts subscale, .79 for the interaction subscale, and .89 for the full 21-item scale. Table 4 
displays the descriptive statistics for the items. 
Table 4 is omitted from this formatted document. 
To examine the CDQ-R's structure, we estimated a CFA of the four subscales using Mplus 6.1. 
Each item served as an indicator for its respective subscale, no cross-loadings or correlated 
residuals were specified, and each subscale factor covaried freely with the others. The fit of this 
model was mixed: some fit statistics were poor (CFI = .847), and others were acceptable but 
could be better (RMSEA = .071, 90% CI = .068 to .075; SRMR = .062). Table 4 displays the 
loadings from the CFA. 
To gain insight into the sources of strain within the model, we examined modification indices 
based on a threshold of 50 ( Brown, 2006). (We didn't make these changes to the model, but 
doing so would of course improve model fit.) The modification indices suggested two cross-
loadings (loading the dance item on both the drama and arts factors, and loading the 
logic/puzzles item on both the math/science and interaction factors) and several correlated 
residuals (correlating algebra/geometry with chemistry, chemistry with logic/puzzles, and 
teaching/education with playing with children). 
Overall Evaluation 
The most recent version of the CDQ is a good choice for researchers interested in subjective 
beliefs about creativity. It provides a good balance between domain coverage and scale length, 
and the body of work on the CDQ-R and its predecessors (the CSDD and the 56-item CDQ) 
shows that the scale performs well. The main issue for future research concerns the structure of 
the CDQ-R. Shortening the longer CDQ required collapsing some domains: the long version had 
seven domains, but the short version has only four. The marginal fit of the CFA suggests that the 
items and subscales should receive more psychometric attention in the future, either by adding 
items (e.g., creating a distinct teaching/mentoring domain) or by sharpening the distinction 
between the arts and drama domain scales. 
Evaluating the Coherence of the Creativity Scales  
Thus far, we have examined each of the four self-report scales individually, using past research 
and our new data. A natural question, of course, is how the self-report scales relate to each other. 
Table 5 displays the descriptive statistics for the scales and the correlation matrix. For 
completeness, and to illustrate the influence of distribution shape, Table 5 displays descriptive 
statistics for raw scores, transformed scores, and IRT-based trait scores. 
Table 5 is omitted from this formatted document. 
To evaluate whether the creativity scales reflect the same underlying factor, we estimated a 
confirmatory factor analysis of the four scales. For the indicators, we selected the log-
transformed CAQ, the IRT-based trait scores for the BICB and CBI, and the CDQ-R global score 
(the average of the four domain scores). The variance of the latent variable was fixed to 1, and 
the model was estimated with Mplus 6.1 using maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. 
Model fit was good. The chi-square test was significant, χ 2(2 df) = 15.056, p = .0005, which 
isn't surprising given our large sample size, but the remaining fit indices suggested good fit based 
on conventional cut-offs: CFI = .982, SRMR = .020, RMSEA = .071 (90% CI = .040 to .106). 
The standardized factor loadings were high and significant for all four creativity scales: CAQ (β 
= .643), BICB (β = .698), CBI (β = .744), and CDQ-R (β = .605). The reliability of the latent 
creativity variable can be expressed via H, known as maximal reliability ( Drewes, 2000; 
Hancock & Mueller, 2001). H indicates the proportion of variance in the latent variable that is 
explained by the indicators, and it's interpreted much like Cronbach's alpha. For the latent 
creativity variable, H was .78. 2 
In short, the four scales covaried as one would hope, which should reassure researchers 
interested in using them. Despite their differences in scaling and specific constructs, the scales 
overlap substantially. It isn't surprising that the three measures of creative achievement (CAQ, 
BICB, and CBI) covaried with each other, but it is interesting that the CDQ-R, a measure of self-
perceived creativity, covaried just as highly. Our study isn't the first to find such an effect, but it 
does reinforce the notion that people's beliefs about their creativity are usually grounded in real 
differences in abilities and accomplishments, albeit self-reported ones. 
A natural next step would be to incorporate other assessment methods, such as peer ratings of 
creativity, performance tasks, consensual assessments, and archival data. The self-report scales 
in our study covaried well, but they share both common constructs and a common method ( 
Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). We doubt that method variance is a major 
factor in the present data—if it were, evidence for single-factor solutions at the scale-level would 
be better than it is—but a large-scale study that examined a range of constructs and methods 
would illuminate the joint contributions of constructs and methods. 
Conclusions and Recommendations  
Creativity research has had many reviews of creativity assessment over the years, and they often 
end on a grim note (e.g., Hocevar, 1981; Michael & Wright, 1989). Many creativity researchers, 
in our experience, share this glum sense of the field's assessment tools. We think, however, that 
the state of self-report creativity assessment is much better than creativity researchers think it is. 
In this article, we focused on a group of relatively new self-report measures of creativity. Based 
on past research, our scale-specific analyses, and our analyses of how the scales converge, we 
think that this group of scales offers good choices for researchers interested in simple self-report 
measures of creative behavior, achievement, and self-perception. 
Throughout, we have pointed to notable methodological issues, most of which concern item 
scaling and skew. Many of the scales yield categorical or count scores, and the resulting overall 
scores have significant positive skew. We have suggested a range of methods for dealing with 
the non-normal outcomes, including transforming the raw scores or estimating latent trait scores 
using IRT models. Regardless of the method, we do encourage researchers to take skew and 
scaling more seriously than they have been taken in past work. In our data, the raw scores did not 
perform as well based on CFA loadings, patterns of correlations, and number of outlying and 
influential cases, as one would expect. 
A second issue concerns the structural features of the scales. The two scales that focus on 
domains—the CAQ and the CDQ-R—are the most complex structurally. For the CAQ, there's no 
ideal way to distill the 10 domains. Most research has simply averaged or summed the domain 
scores. In our data, factor analyses suggested more than one factor, and latent class analyses 
found that people with high scores sort into different nominal groups, not a single high-scoring 
group. People with equally high overall scores thus have high achievements in different domains. 
Given the many successful applications of the CAQ, however, we suspect that using a 
transformed sum score is probably okay for the low-stakes basic research that the scale is used 
for. For the CDQ-R, the four factor domain structure could probably use some additional 
refinement, given the mixed fit of the confirmatory factor analyses. 
The self-report scales discussed here have fared well in past research and in the present research, 
but we should emphasize that they were all developed for low-stakes assessment purposes. To 
date, there's no evidence to support their valid use for high-stakes purposes, such as screening 
people for employment or making educational decisions. “Faking good” is easy to do on these 
scales for respondents who want to appear to be more creative than they really are, so scores 
from high-stakes contexts will be suspect. We doubt that many participants in a research project 
do this—the achievement and behavior scales (CAQ, BICB, and CBI) have skewed scores that 
pile up on the floor, so at least the majority of the sample feels comfortable giving low scores. 
The scales reviewed here also have consistent, replicated effects with other variables, which 
provide evidence for the scores' validity. Nevertheless, researchers should keep in mind that even 
extensive evidence for validity in low-stakes domains doesn't mean that an assessment tool is 
suitable for other purposes ( Messick, 1995). 
We imagine that many researchers would ask “Which scale should I use?” These scales vary on 
several dimensions that can aid in assessment decisions. First, the scales vary in how they treat 
domains. Some scales provide scores for distinct domains (the CAQ and CDQ-R), and others 
provide only domain-general scores (the BICB and CBI). Second, the scales vary in whether they 
evaluate eminent or everyday creativity. Some scales enable researchers to assess uncommon 
Big-C levels of creativity (the CAQ), and others focus on common little-c creativity (the BICB, 
CBI, and CDQ-R). Third, the scales vary in whether they assess public behaviors or inner self-
beliefs. Some scales focus on creative behaviors and observable accomplishments (the CAQ, 
BICB, and CBI), and others focus on subjective self-beliefs regarding creativity (the CDQ-R). 
Table 6 classifies each scale on these dimensions. 
Table 6 is omitted from this formatted document. 
That said, the best answer to “Which scale should I use?” is “all of them.” We encourage 
researchers to use as many measurement tools as is feasible, given the limits on time and 
resources, including several self-report measures of creative actions and thinking styles that 
weren't included or reviewed here ( Durmysheva & Kozbelt, 2010; Ivcevic & Mayer, 2009; 
Runco, Plucker, & Lim, 2001). Including multiple measures is better for many obvious reasons, 
but one less obvious reason is that it will accelerate the growth of evidence in creativity 
assessment. We agree with the many researchers who have pointed out that creativity assessment 
has not advanced as quickly as other fields have (see Plucker & Makel, 2010). The field's 
knowledge about how its tools perform will develop more quickly when more of the scales are 
used more often. 
Footnotes 
1 Regarding the nuts and bolts of the latent class analysis, we explored at least 1000 initial 
starting values and allowed at least 100 to terminate to a final solution. Final models were then 
replicated across seed values. To choose a final class solution, we used classification quality, 
entropy (.930 in this solution), the BIC, and the corrected and bootstrapped versions of the 
likelihood ratio test ( Nylund, Asparouhov, & Muthén, 2007). We also preferred, all else equal, 
models with fewer classes, which are more likely to replicate in future research. Three cases with 
extreme CAQ scores were dropped to enable model convergence—this is another example of the 
CAQ's vexing skew. 
2 We don't recommend using the highly skewed raw scores, but for the morbidly curious, a CFA 
of the four indicators' raw scores showed similar results. Model fit was good, χ 2(2 df) = 7.727, p 
= .021, CFI = .978, SRMR = .018, RMSEA = .047 (90% CI = .016 to .084). Maximal reliability 
for this model was H = .76. The indicators had good loadings on the latent variable, although 
several were notably lower: CAQ (β = .450), BICB (β = .715), CBI (β = .766), and CDQ (β = 
.571). Furthermore, the model with raw scores had more outlying and influential cases, appraised 
using Cook's D and the individual log-likelihoods, than the other model. Such findings aren't 
surprising, and they reinforce the need for creativity researchers to pay attention to distributional 
assumptions with scales that yield skewed scores. 
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